Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Stroud I 170
CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Carnap: Thesis: we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if an appropriate sensation is possible for us - if we can determine the truth of the corresponding sentences. - Then we have to determine a sphere within which this is possible.
Stroud I 173
Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: E.g. the sentence: "No one will ever know if __." Here the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because unverifiable - Meaningless: neither true nor false - then the question "Are there external things?" would be pointless, because neither true nor false. - Useful, however: internal questions: questions of existence within an area of ​​knowledge. - Within an area of ​​knowledge: the same sentence can be produced - i.e. the syntax is not decisive. - Sense: something that is true cannot contradict something that is meaningless. - CarnapVsSkepticsm: meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable.
I 179
Descartes: has the same explanation for the truth of skepticism as Carnap for its futility: the lack of verifiability of empirical existence statements.
Stroud I 187
CarnapVsSkepticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic frame (reference system) - Knowledge/Carnap: Two components: 1) Experience - 2) Linguistic frame (reference system), within which we understand the experience.
I 188
The only theoretical question is that about the rules of the system. - Mother Tongue/Carnap: we do not choose it - therefore, it reflects no thesis about the existence of the outside world. - Decision: if we continue to use it. - Problem: because it is a decision there are no objective facts that make it.
Stroud I 191
Skepticism/Reference System/StroudVsCarnap: introduces a "we" and experience as something that happens to us - The fact that we exist and have experience cannot just be regarded as an "internal" truth of the thing language.
Stroud I 193ff
StroudVsCarnap: either leads to idealism or to metaphysical realism or to skepticism all three of which he rejects - because of the futility of external questions.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


> Counter arguments against Carnap
> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24