Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Senseless/meaningless: Meaningless in philosophy and logic are statements which cannot be negated. False assertions on the other hand are never senseless. Otherwise, their truth value could not be established. See also Sense, Truth, Negation, Meaning, Sentence meaning, Truth value, Misinformation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Carl Hempel on Sensible/senseless - Dictionary of Arguments
II 110 Sensible/negation/sense/significance/verificationism/Hempel: problem: if a singular statement makes sense, its negation is a universal statement ("nothing has property P") and generalizations are senseless because they cannot be verified according to the verificationism. II 111 Empiricist criterion of meaning/Hempel: the empiricist criterion of meaning is provisionally a falsifiability principle. Vs: 1. That excludes pure existence assertions. 2. Conjunctions with not completely falsifiable parts are completely falsifiable. 3. An observation predicate "all things have the property p" is then significant because it is falsifiable but not the negation. II 114 Empiricist criterion of meaning/Carnap/Hempel: Solution: a solution is offered here by the translatability into empiricist (artificial, ideal) language. II 121 Translations are indirectly a partial interpretation of the hypothesis and the structures through which they are formulated. II 125 The empiricist criterion of meaning is a linguistic design; it is neither true nor false. 1. The explication should provide a nearly complete analysis of the generally accepted sense of the explicandum. 2. It is to carry out a rational reconstruction of explicandum. >Sense, >Meaning, >Significance._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Hempel
> Counter arguments in relation to Sensible/senseless
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20