Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Hintikka I 78
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content.
I 107
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object.
I 109
Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic.
I 114
Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul."
I 180
Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object.
I 322
Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data.
II 87
Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori.
II 92
Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time.
II 100
Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other.
II 101
The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary.
II 101
Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms.
II 102
The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects.
II 129
Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum.
II 134
Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Sense Data Theory

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-25