Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Sense, philosophy: sense is a property of statements which makes the determination of the truth value (true or false) possible, although not guaranteed. Even false statements make sense; otherwise their falsehood could not be established. What is meaningless, therefore, is what cannot be negated. Statements about the future allow an assessment of probabilities if they are sensible without having a truth value. Wishes and commands are sensible and understandable if they can be reformulated into negative statements. See also understanding, negation, truth values, verification, determination, indeterminacy, probability, Fregean sense.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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II 3
Sense/useful/useless/Wittgenstein: when it make sense to say: "There are four primary colors", it must also make sense to say: "There are five primary colors." See also II 113, II 167, II 372.
II 59
Sense/Fraud/error/Wittgenstein: what allows us to judge the world correctly, also allows us to misjudge it.
II 69
Sense/nonsense/useful/useless/Wittgenstein: E.g "This sound is red" is not wrong, but nonsense - to name something a color is to say that it obeys certain grammatical rules - limit: I cannot say, sounds would have properties that do not belong to the colors, because then I would have to say sensibly that colors have properties that they do not have. - ((s) I would have to be able to deny it.) - E.g. "colors are not loud". - Sense and nonsense have nothing in common- meaningless word combinations are not part of the language - grammar sets the limit.
II 171
Sense/Wittgenstein. We can talk of "sense" without giving the expression a clear meaning.
II 402
Rule/sense/Wittgenstein: E.g. the command "replace seven by zero" makes no sense, except that it specifies a rule. - ((s) rules do not need to give sense beyond that).
II 412
Proof/sense/Wittgenstein: nonsense: to say, only the evidence gives the question a sense. - Correct: the evidence provides a possibility to respond. - With that it gives the question a sense. - ((s) Third, intermediate instance.)
III 144
Sense/Show/Tell/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: the phrase is used, to express the idea - on the other hand, the sense can only be specified by specifying the truth conditions or repeating the sentence.
VII 27
Sense/Tractatus/Tetens: controversial thesis: that only descriptive sentences made sense. - Ethics: Problem: normative statements are meaningless.
I 22
Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) His agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts.
Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be claimed linguistically. (Tractatus 6.2322).
I 149
Picture Theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-26