Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Sense, philosophy: sense is a property of statements which makes the determination of the truth value (true or false) possible, although not guaranteed. Even false statements make sense; otherwise their falsehood could not be established. What is meaningless, therefore, is what cannot be negated. Statements about the future allow an assessment of probabilities if they are sensible without having a truth value. Wishes and commands are sensible and understandable if they can be reformulated into negative statements. See also understanding, negation, truth values, verification, determination, indeterminacy, probability, Fregean sense.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Dummett III 56 ff
Sense/Frege: two arguments: 1) sentence is the smallest unit
2) truth plays the crucial role in explaining the meaning.
Sense: is part of the meaning, relevant for truth or falsity - The meaning of a sentence, as such, does not determine the truth. - So the sense only determines the truth conditions.
Truth also depends on nature of the world. - When sense determines the semantic value, the contribution of the world is already presumed.
Dummett III 64
Sense/Reference/Frege: The argument (a sentence is the smallest unit of sense) has two premises:
a) all predicative knowledge is based on propositional knowledge
b) For certain predicative knowledge there is more than just one proposition.
Therefore, no mere knowledge of the reference is possible.
Dummett III 74
Sense/Dummett: not only by verification method, but by understanding the circumstances which must be realized. -(E.g. Goldbach’s conjecture)
Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that we can, in principle, recognize it as true if it is true (unicorn, Goldbach’s conjecture). - But Frege’s argument does not depend on bivalence.
Dummett III 76
Bivalence does apply, however, for elementary propositions: if the semantic value here is the extension, it does not have to be decided whether the predicate is true or not. - It may not be possible to effectively decide the application, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without being able to allocate the semantic value (here truth value). - Therefore, distinction between sense and semantic value.
Dummett III 133
Sense/Frege/Dummett: is constituted by the manner of givenness - but is not identical with it.
- - -
Frege V 100f
Meaning/Sense/Frege/Husted: if both were equal, a sentence could not say anything that everyone who knows the name did not know already - meaning of a name: the object. - The fact that a name stands for an object is a result, not part of the fact that it has a purpose.
V 103
Frege: sense of the sentence = Truth condition >Dummett >Wittgenstein - Understanding, knowing what must be the case.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-22