|Sense, philosophy: sense is a property of statements which makes the determination of the truth value (true or false) possible, although not guaranteed. Even false statements make sense; otherwise their falsehood could not be established. What is meaningless, therefore, is what cannot be negated. Statements about the future allow an assessment of probabilities if they are sensible without having a truth value. Wishes and commands are sensible and understandable if they can be reformulated into negative statements. See also understanding, negation, truth values, verification, determination, indeterminacy, probability, Fregean sense._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
Sense / Cresswell: Here a structure e.g. from individual references of the parts.
"Meaning = structure". (> Sensitivity of "that" on the parts of the complement sentence (after "that") - not only on the whole sentence - because of the attribution of propositional attitudes that can be wrong when substituted.
That has to do with Frege’s "way of givenness".
Sense / Cresswell: (see above): consists in the structures that are formed from the meanings of the parts - contrary to that: Reference / Cresswell: is the result of the fact that the parts of an expression stand in relation to one another in the way of argument and function.
Reference/(s): (see above): should be the simple whole.
Intension: also a simple entity.
Attribution of propositional attitudes/Cresswell: should be sensitive to the structure (parts), not to the intension. -
Meaning (= structure) is not the same as reference. - Reference: = intension (= "whole")._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984