Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 28
Sense / Cresswell: Here a structure e.g. from individual references of the parts - "meaning = structure". (> Sensitivity of "that" on the parts of the complement sentence (after "that") - not only on the whole sentence - because of the attribution of propositional attitudes that can be wrong when substituted - II. 26 that has to do with Frege’s "way of givenness".
II 77
Sense / Cresswell: (see above): consists in the structures that are formed from the meanings of the parts - contrary to that: Reference / Cresswell: is the result of the fact that the parts of an expression stand in relation to one another in the way of argument and function - Reference / (s): (see above): should be the simple whole. - Intension: also a simple entity. - attribution of propositional attitudes / Cresswell: should be sensitive to the structure (parts), not to the intension. -
II 86
meaning (= structure) is not the same as reference. - Reference: = intension (= "whole").

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

> Counter arguments against Cresswell
> Counter arguments in relation to Sense

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29