|Semantic facts, philosophy: whether semantic facts are accepted within a theory depends on the orientation of this theory. That is, it depends on whether the theory is concerned with the use of language or with a more or less physical description of external objects. In the latter case, semantic facts should not be decisive. See also facts, truth maker, semantics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Horwich I 358
semantic fact / Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: e.g. if "that’s true" is true, then there is a corresponding fact - this is a semantic fact. - Problem / Field: how can physicalism express that? - Single fact: that snow is white. - Solution / KGB: a non-semantic equivalent of the T-predicate is non-extensional, as an agreed definiens, expressing a "pre-theoretical T-concept" - instead of irreducible semantic facts. - (CGB Vs "Facts About Truth") ) - Other semantic facts: about reference, about synonymy. - These may not be physicalistically eliminable. (CampVs, GroverVs, BelnapVs)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover A Prosentential Theory of Thruth Princeton New Jersey 1992
D.L.Grover, J.L.Kamp, N.D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994