|Semantic facts, philosophy: whether semantic facts are accepted within a theory depends on the orientation of this theory. That is, it depends on whether the theory is concerned with the use of language or with a more or less physical description of external objects. In the latter case, semantic facts should not be decisive. See also facts, truth maker, semantics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Grover, D. L. on Semantic Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 358
Semantic Facts/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: e.g. if "that’s true" is true, then there is a corresponding fact - this is a semantic fact. Problem/Field: how can physicalism express that? A single fact is e.g. that snow is white. Solution/CGB: a non-semantic equivalent of the truth predicate is non-extensional, as an agreed definiens, expressing a "pre-theoretical truth concept" - instead of irreducible semantic facts (CGBVs "Facts About Truth"). There are also other semantic facts, e.g. about reference, about synonymy. These may not be physicalistically eliminable (CampVs, GroverVs, BelnapVs)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994