Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Semantic facts, philosophy: whether semantic facts are accepted within a theory depends on the orientation of this theory. That is, it depends on whether the theory is concerned with the use of language or with a more or less physical description of external objects. In the latter case, semantic facts should not be decisive. See also facts, truth maker, semantics.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 469
Make true/fact/Brandom: misleading: it is not the fact that p what makes true that p - solution: in a sense, facts are what makes assertion acts true - there are no specific semantic facts - probably physical facts are made true by physical predicates, but not semantic facts by a semantic predicate - "true that snow ...": a semantic predicate for a non-semantic fact.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


> Counter arguments against Brandom



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-21