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Semantic ascent/Science/Quine: E.g. relativity theory: overturned conceptions, but evaluation only based on the old conceptions - petitio principii. - Solution: Semantic ascent: comparison of symbol structures: then select greater simplicity - ((s) distinction between conception and meaning) - ((s) purely behaviorist).
VII 15 ~
Semantic ascent/Quine: thus the dispute about what exists is translated into one about words - but that does not mean that existence depends on words.
Semantic ascent/Quine: solution for generalization where letters replace names of things and at the same time whole sentences. - Wrong: p or not p for all things in such a way that sentences are names for them. - Ascent: only through sentences: correct: every sentence of the form p or not p is true. Generalization: two kinds: a) if names change: from Hans is Hans and from Fritz is Fritz, etc. Every thing is itself: no problem, no semantic ascent necessary. - b) generalization of Hans is mortal or Hans is not mortal: semantic ascent. - ((s) Also because of the logical constant).
Truth predicate/Semantic ascent/Quine/(s): truth predicate quasi reverses semantic ascent, because it ensures that one does not have to talk about language (in semantic ascent) - Quine: it reminds in the ascent that we are targeting the world - by calling the sentence true we call the snow white. - truth predicate: reverses the quotation marks. - Sentence: simply utter it in order to assert it. - Then no quotation marks and no truth predicate. - truth predicate: necessary for generalization about an infinite number of sentences: E.g. all sentences of the form p or not p are true.
Truth predicate: reinstates reference to the object that was eliminated by the semantic ascent.
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in a dimension which cannot be grasped by a variable.
Semantic ascent/generalization/Quine: without semantic ascent: if direct quantification possible in object language: E.g. (x)(x =). - (Only if identity predicate = is considered to be a logical particle and not part of the lexicon (normal predicate) - Semantic ascent: If identity is a true predicate, then only indirect generalization possible, through language, not objects.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003