|Semantic ascent, philosophy: semantic ascent is an expression by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, From a logical point of view, Harvard, 1953). The semantic ascent is no longer about objects, but about the use of expressions for these objects and of expressions for properties which we ascribe to these objects. In this way, the question as to which objects an ontology is fixed on is only indirectly addressed. See also mention, use, meaning, reference, semantic descent, ontology, non-existence, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Grover, D. L. on Semantic Ascent - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 357
"Semantic descent"/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: we could call an inference from the truth of (the completely unlikely) sentence "there was one foot of snow in Alabama" to the conclusion ((s) about the world) that there was one foot of snow in Alabama. - "That there is a foot ..." is then a canonical name for a proposition and has quantificatorical force. - (CGBVs: that is philosophically uninteresting)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|Grover, D. L.
Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992
D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)
See external reference in the individual contributions.
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994