Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 280
Semantic descent/Wright: Instead of talking about words, talking about facts, objects, substantial truth. Boghossian promised to avoid this descent.
I 280
Thought/sentence/object language/meta language/Wright: the question whether the sentence "My lawn is green" is true, depends on its meaning, the status of the idea that my lawn is green, does not depend on it.
  In the semantic descent from sentence to thought - we left the meaning behind us.
WrightVs: that does not do more than sticking your head in the sand.
How could the assertion that P could escape the fate of its metalinguistic counterpart if the fate of the latter is sealed only by the participation of the content?

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantics

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28