Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 17
Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantic facts: E.g. which language is spoken in a possible world - or whether we interpret the language with our language from the real world or the one they speak there - or if we actually denote the language of the real world or the local language of the possible worlds from the perspective of the possible worlds itself.These facts ensure that our signs have the representational properties that they have - on these facts depends what is said or thought.
I 82
Semantics/Syntax/language-independent/Stalnaker: the step from syntax to semantics frees the theory from language dependence.
I 149
Modal Semantics/Stalnaker: should allocate a separate range to each possible worlds -((s) but then you can no longer call possible worlds "ways of how things could be").
I 191
Semantics/Stalnaker/(s): meanign from real world - Meta-semantics: meaning from respective possible world Because meta-semantics asks by which facts the semantic value is created and the facts must be from the respective possible world.
I 192
Semantics: says which semantic values ​​have the expressions of a language - Meta-semantics: what facts determine the semantic values.
Pre-Semantics/Kaplan: refers to those who believe that a name means something that is at the end of a historic chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: rather gives us the meaning than telling us how it could be discovered. - Similar to Kripke.
I 196
Possible world/Actual World/Meta-Semantics/MS/Stalnaker: Meta-semantics: takes into account the facts that determine the semantic values ​​- i.e. ultimately it takes into account the differences between possible worlds - therefore, MS is suitable if you want to consider a possible world as actual world - it is the meta-semantically understood primary intension of a statement that provides the information that we want to transmit.
I 199
Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: should be interpreted meta-semantically - not semantically - Meta-semantics: is fact based, therefore no access to a priori truth. - Semantics: must take internal states.
I 213/14
Semantic/Meta-Semantics/Semantics/Stalnaker: E.g. Assuming we can only say how things possibly are, given the facts, how they actually are. - Then: semantic: the set S only expresses the Proposition Q under condition P. meta-semantic: sentence S expresses only a conditional proposition, not a singular one - i.e. not the content depends on the facts, but it is relative itself.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30