Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 13
Semantic Property/Schiffer: e.g. to have content - Truth theoretical property: to be true.
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I 14
Relation theories/intention bases semantics/i.b.s./Grice: Solution: semantic properties (s.p.) are permitted if they do not stem from the public language - then no circularity - propositions: not-public - sentences: public.
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I 221
Verificationist Semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): Verification conditions instead of truth conditions - DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain a truth theory.
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I 241
Intentionality/Semantics/Schiffer: semantic concepts can be defined in terms of propostional atittudes - but not vice versa - there are no propositional attitudes as belief properties or belief objects.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantics



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28