Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Gareth Evans
EMD II 210
  interpretive / interpretational semantics / Evans: would have to assume an entity for any type of semantic expression - a set, a truth value, a function of quantities on truth values, etc. - which could be attributed to the events of this kind under any interpretation. Then we could take the specification of the type of attribution as a specification of the underlying system, which has a word in common with others -
II 213
instead of a single unsorted range, it will be appropriate to divide the area into fundamental types of objects: places, times, material objects, living objects, events ... then we can understand e.g. "A set of pairs of living objects and times" as a verb.

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25