Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Self-ascription, philosophy: self-attribution is the identification of properties by a subject that refers to itself through this act. The important fact is that this type of statements can claim a higher degree of certainty than external attribution b y a different person. See also certainty, attribution, ascription, truth conditions, privileged access, introspection, I, self, person.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

Gareth Evans on Self- Ascription - Dictionary of Arguments

Frank I 524
Mental self-ascription/Evans: if one ascribes an opinion to oneself, then the view is, so to speak, and often literally is, directed outwards - to the world - we can do without the "inner view". - Mental Self-Ascription is not infallible. >Incorrigibility.
I 530
Evans: self-ascription of experience does not require any special skill of an inner sense. - No disposition for cases of correct judgments, that guaranteed infallibility.
Information stance: with content: e.g., "as if a thousand tiny needles .." / without content: e.g., "pain", "itching".


Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-25
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