|Self-identification, philosophy: here we are concerned with the conditions for the ability of a thinking subject to distinguish itself from other subjects or objects in order to relate to itself with language, gestures, and actions. See also private language, privileged access, identification, individuation, introspection, self, I, self-attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 504 ~
Uncorrigibility/Evans: the view is idealistic if it assumes the self-construction of the world through us. On the other hand, the possibility of identifying ourselves as objective persons cannot be exploited verificationistically.
Immunity/Evans: immunity is a direct result of demonstrative identification - but it is not about "identification". - erorr: to believe that immunity does not extend to physical characteristics.
Self-identification/Evans: logical form: structure: if we consider [I am F] as if it were based on [b is F] and [I am b], then we get into trouble. - (see chapter 6.6)
Identification/self-identification/I/Evans: identification is based on localization in space.
I 557 ~
Self-identification/SI/Evans: you cannot identify yourself as a "bearer of pain" (circular) - pain must first be learned through your own experience. - ((s) Correspondingly with other physical experiences: body does not identify the self/I.) - The idea that I associate with my name does not allow self-identification. - Self-Identification: is mixed and not decomposable (in physical/mental components) - otherwise it is circular. It is not absurd that one cannot identify oneself._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994