|Self-identification, philosophy: here we are concerned with the conditions for the ability of a thinking subject to distinguish itself from other subjects or objects in order to relate to itself with language, gestures, and actions. See also private language, privileged access, identification, individuation, introspection, self, I, self-attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Self-identification/Mach: E.g. "What a run-down a schoolmaster comes here." It was he himself, who saw himself in the mirror.
Self-identification/Self/Chisholm: "he himself" only shifts the problem - differences: "There exists an x such that x thinks that x is wise, and he is x" - "There exists an x such that x thinks that x is wise and x is x"? - No clear formulation: the property of taking oneself to be wise - ChisholmVs: impossible proposition.
Chisholm: "... that he is x" always implies that x is x, but not vice versa that x is he!._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004