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|Frank I 190
Self-Identification/I/Self/Hume/Kant: you cannot perceive yourself as the object that implements the experience - instead you identify an object in the experience with a thing that is not part of the experience, and it is this thing to which the person concerned refers with "I" - Castaneda pro.
I/Self/Identification/Carl Ginet/Castaneda: ingenious analysis, seems to preserve the directly relating role of 'he*": E.g. for every sentence of the form" X believes that he* is H" there is a translation without "he*": Proposal: "X considers the proposition to be true that X would express if X said "I am H" - CastanedaVsGinet: 1) the mere utterance of "I am H" does not guarantee that any proposition is expressed at all - 2) circular: then you also have to analyze "what it usually means".
Self-Identification/Castaneda: you should not and cannot identify yourself with every description - otherwise the heaviest man in Europe would know that he is without ever stepping on a scale - therefore, "he*" must not be used as an independent symbol.
Self-Identification/Castaneda: in order for X to refer to Y as Z, X must not only identify Y with Z, but also represent Z as Z (representation) - accumulation of references - "boxes in boxes" - box: fragment of the world as person understands it - De Dicto/Castaneda: pictures of representations: boxes in boxes - De Re/Castaneda: simply the references of the speaker - also on non-existent things.
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994