Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege: "completing sense": intentional contents are never undetermined (SearleVsQuine: no undetermined sailboat can be desired).
II 275F
Indexicality/completing Fregean sense/Heimson/SearleVsKaplan: I, you, this, here, etc. always have a form of self-reference: they always express an intentional content because the speaker refers to a particular entity - this is Frege's "sense of proper names".
II 278
Self-reference/Searle: E.g. there is a hand, and because there is a hand it is causing this visual experience - the self-reference is shown, but not seen - the one of the indexical statements is also shown but not claimed.
II 284f
SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential - they express different levels of intentional content - the use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it applies.
III 62
Circles: only problem in definition, not in use: as long as the object plays the role, we do not need to define the word. - Linguistic explanations are no circles: language is intended to explain itself, it needs no language, because it is already language.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24