Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 75
Self-reference/Nozick: (in all possible worlds) has two components:
a) rigid: in all worlds to the same thing
b) in each possible world to itself (in this one possible world).
Therefore the term must be defined by its meaning - which in turn makes circumstances superfluous. - Rigidity insufficient: E.g. Gödel number. - (but the Gödel number is necessary self-referential).
II 81
I/self-reference/truth/semantic facts/Nozick: Problem: truth (or semantic fact) does not help to know that you are the one, to which a sentence with "I" refers to - e.g. "Only this originator of tokens "I am in Cambridge" ". - Here you still have to know that you are there. - Otherwise, there is nothing better than "exactly this X". - ((S) solution/(s): It must be knowledge about the truth.)
II 93
Self-reference/Nozick: should not be defined by a permanent feature, but by something that arises in the act of referencing. - ((S) That is then indexical, but unproblematic). - Punchline: E.g. "exactly this" will still be described from the outside - that means, it is still not reflexive. - Nozick: pro: then there is no question "How is that possible?".

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29