|Self-referentiality, philosophy: A) self-reference is the description of an action or statement of a thinking subject, which is about this subject. B) is the nature of a linguistic expression (word or sentence) which, by its application, should apply to this expression. See also circularity, external/internal, reference system, paradoxes, heterology, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Self-reference/Nozick: (in all possible worlds) has two components:
a) rigid: in all worlds to the same thing
b) in each possible world to itself (in this one possible world).
Therefore the term must be defined by its meaning - which in turn makes circumstances superfluous. - Rigidity insufficient: E.g. Gödel number. - (but the Gödel number is necessary self-referential).
I/self-reference/truth/semantic facts/Nozick: Problem: truth (or semantic fact) does not help to know that you are the one, to which a sentence with "I" refers to - e.g. "Only this originator of tokens "I am in Cambridge" ". - Here you still have to know that you are there. - Otherwise, there is nothing better than "exactly this X". - ((S) solution/(s): It must be knowledge about the truth.)
Self-reference/Nozick: should not be defined by a permanent feature, but by something that arises in the act of referencing. - ((S) That is then indexical, but unproblematic). - Punchline: E.g. "exactly this" will still be described from the outside - that means, it is still not reflexive. - Nozick: pro: then there is no question "How is that possible?"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994