Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Frank I 41ff
Self-consciousness/Strawson: M-predicates: do not presuppose consciousness to which they are attributed - P-predicates: (psychological): imply that the person to whom they are attributed, knows this - Definition P*-predicates/Shoemaker: it is impossible that any other subject, except me, can have certain properties.
Strawson I 130
I/self-consciousness/Strawson: previously only: all my experiences are specifically related to the body M, this one is distinguished by that - but the same goes for all other bodies in each case - problem: what does the word "mine" has to do in it?
I 131
Uniqueness of the body is no guarantee of Cartesian soul - solution: we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (but not fundamental) concept.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23