|Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: unsatisfactory: Vsontological solution: wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in the wrong way. - Nagel: center position Thesis: there is an objective self - StalnakerVsNagel The semantic diagnosis has more potential than Nagel thinks - Simple solution: context-dependent or subjective information.
Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: are sets of uncentered possible worlds. - = Self-attribution of property - see Nagel.
objective self/modest semantic view/Stalnaker: dispenses with subjective content that would be more than self-localization - no realm of subjective facts.
Then one would have to know what it is like for Napoleon to be Napoleon if all the facts are considered -> see minimal subject.
Objective Self/StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) - 1) Takes on an extravagant metaphysics - 2) requires an explanation of the special relationship that we still would have to it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003