Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
II 61
Identity/time/self/I/Nozick: because it is highly conceptual, a scheme appears to be necessary - this should choose between near and immediate successors, etc. - But I do not need the scheme to find out my goals, but to find out whose goals are mine. - Problem: who applies actually the scheme?
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II 78
Definition I/self/some authors: to be an I or to be self, means to have the ability of reflexive self-reference.
NozickVs: 1. This ability must just have existed sometime - 2. beings: from the fact that I have this ability, it does not follow that it is essential. - In addition: the reflexive self-reference gives me access to the self, but that does not guarantee that it is part of my nature as self.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


> Counter arguments against Nozick
> Counter arguments in relation to Self ...

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-23