Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Stalnaker I 260
Objective Self/Nagel/NagelVsOntological View: if "being me" was to be an objective property, the assumption collapses that it could also be in relation to anyone else. But if it is an aspect of the objective TN, I can ask again "Which of these people am I". No matter to what extent we complete the concept of non-centered world, the fact that I’m TN will be missing. (p. 56) - Stalnaker pro. - But: the objective property fulfills two conditions:
1) only TN has it
2) Only the person who has it can attribute it.
Problem: "TN’s self-property" is non-rigid. - There are possible worlds where TN and SK are reversed.
Stalnaker I 262
True Self/Nagel: is not the perspective and has no perspective. (In the non-centric world) - that’s what it is about when I look at the world as a whole and ask: "How can I be TN?" - It’s not about ontology.
Stalnaker I 263
StalnakerVsNagel: the fact that I can imagine a situation does not mean that I could be in it - see Stalnaker.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-24