Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Nozick II 94
Self /I/ unity / Hume / Kant / Nozick: not only by temporal sequence of thoughts or just words in a mind. - E.g. several persons think one word of a sentence each - then the unity will not be made by any person in addition thinking "I think". - II 97 Reference: If the relation "refers to" itself does not possess the required unity, then it cannot establish it. - I: synthesis of I does not presuppose a pre-existent uniform I. - "How-come"-question / Nozick: I need no proof that there is unity, I want to know how is it possible? - For I do not have to start with separate things and try to establish a unity.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-28