Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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V 274
Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role - the content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it - Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. - E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper.
V 275
Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance - it’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>Veridical).
V 280
Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process.
V 281
Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself.
V 280
Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (1972) LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid.
V 283
Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

David K. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-04-20