|Pain, philosophy of mind: the philosophical discussion deals with the peculiarities of the concept of pain in contrast to other concepts such as perceptions, sensations and stimuli. In particular, it is about the relationship between physical and mental realization of pain. See also mind body problem, physical/psychic, rigidity, possible worlds, possible world semantics, perception, introspection, private language, necessity, certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Hintikka I 339
Pain/sensation/error/delusion/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: I cannot systematically deceive myself in identifying my feelings - the connection to the public language is logical (conceptual), not empirical. - ((s)> Davidson).
Pain/blue book/criterion: E.g. how I explain my toothache to someone else: I hold my jaw.
E.g. Supposing I observe, in certain cases, that someone has a red spot on the jaw. I would then conclude that certain phenomena always occured with the appearance of the red spot. ...
How do you know that someone has a toothache, if he holds his jaw? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, that is, we have arrived at the conventions.
These "conventions" are exactly the same what Wittgenstein calls elsewhere in this discussion "criteria". They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of expression "toothache".
"Using a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. I do not identify my sensation through criteria but I use the same expression.
Behavior/language/meaning/Wittgenstein/Philosophical examination/Hintikka: if one teaches a child the word "pain", so one teaches the child a new pain-behavior.
The word expression replaces crying and does not describe it.
But if that is so, the use of the word "pain" can be as little related to criteria such as the crying of the child is based on criteria.
Pain/Wittgenstein/late: there is simply no criterion for pain. Criteria are only criteria because of the language game, whose "steps" they are. Only in the language game of spontaneous pain expression a distorted face is a "criterion".
Picture/terminology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not like the term "picture" in the Philosophical Investigation § 301 anymore: "An idea is not a picture but a picture may correspond to it." "To say: the picture of pain enters the language game with the word "pain", is a misunderstanding. The idea of pain is not a picture but the idea of pain well enters in a sense the language game, just not as a picture..."
Pain/Wittgenstein: we certainly have criteria for real pain as opposed to feigned in others. - It is not so that we can only know foreign pain indirectly like we e.g. cannot see the content of a foreign purse - meaningful: "His pain is worse than mine" - pointless: "two people cannot have the same pain." - Pointless: if there is no criterion - then it is meaningless to speak of ignorance.
Pain: Does not refer to an owner. - One might as well say "There is pain".
The location of the pain sensation has nothing to do with the person.
Pain/Wittgenstein/Schulte: for pain, I distinguish intensity - not owners.
Bubner I 212
Pain/Wittgenstein/Bubner: is not the actual object of investigation, otherwise the psychical would be declared a realm of objects of its own kind._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992