Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 167
A certain sensation (pain) could not have existed without being a sensation.
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I 167
Pain: It is a mistake to think that a pain S and a brain condition B could exist independently.
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Rorty I 93
Kripke/Rorty: Same epistemic situation: even in the absence of heat you can be in the same epistemic situation that you can feel the heat sensation.
Pain: in the case of pain and other mental phenomena this is not possible. Being in the same epidemic situation that would exist if there was a pain means to be in pain.
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I 174
Heat: although "heat" is a rigid designator, the reference is determined with respect to an accidental property.
Pain: a rigid designator whose reference is determined by an essential property of the reference. (LewisVs)

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29