Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
III 229ff
Slingshot Argument/Searle: originally from Frege; Quine against the modal logic used by Davidson; revived against the correspondence theory.
---
III 230
If a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact - hence the notion of correspondence is completely empty - the proposition that snow is white, corresponds to the fact that grass is green - Analysis: Difference between co-referential singular terms and equivalent sentences - E.g. "x is identical with Diogenes and snow is white".
---
III 231
Solution/Searle: 1st irrelevance: "Diogenes" - 2nd logical equivalence of sentences does not mean identity of the relevant facts - Conclusion/Searle: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Slingshot Argument



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29