# Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Schematic letters, logic: the schematic letters F, G, H ... stand in logical formulas for properties, in contrast to the variables x, y, z ..., which represent objects to which properties are attributed. E.g. (Ex) (Fx) "There is an F". Properties cannot be quantified over in first order logic. That is, it is impossible to express what number of properties belong to an object. See also quantification, quantifiability, second order logic, “Everything he said is true”, completeness.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Books on Amazon

II 201f
Problem: do not reify properties and classes. Solution: distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables.
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IX 7ff~
Predicate letters: F, G, etc. do not introduce anything explicit ((>Scheme).
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IX 7ff~
Statement schemes: the predicate letters F, G ... should never be considered as variables that take attributes or classes as values ​​- they are kept away from quantifiers and do not appear in statements at all.
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X 32
Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is not even variable over objects, and once schematic letter for sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary).
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X 47
Schematic letters/Quine: placeholders for sentences of the object language. They do not belong to the object language itself.
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X 77
Model/Quine: of a scheme: is a quantity n-tuple: each schematic letter (for predicates) corresponds to a set, at the beginning of the n-tuple is a non-empty set U, the universal set or value range ​​of the variables x, x, etc. the remaining sets of the model are the values ​​of the set variables a, b, etc. Satisfaction: a model fulfills a scheme, if its set-theoretic analogue (sentence) is true - X 78 e.g. a model.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

> Counter arguments against Quine

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-04-23