Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Scheme, content, philosophy: here we are concerned about whether statements can be made without a relativization to a conceptual system, a language or a subject domain. See also conceptual schemata, reference systems, content, substance, propositional content, semantic content, external/internal.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
NagelVs alternative conceptual schemes: There are such schemes where we cannot even get out if we look at ourselves from the outside as thinking beings. Therefore, the idea of ​​a different kind of consciousness or conceptual scheme contributes nothing to distance ourselves from such thoughts. (VsScheme)
I 50 ~
DavidsonVs alternative conceptual schemes (similar to Nagel): I must capture the alien consciousness using the categories of my own. But that’s not the whole point: rather, it is the real content of certain ideas about the world, and certain forms of thought that determines the conditions of the interpretation: nothing that does not fufil these conditions could be considered thinking. I 51~
I 52
Nagel: there is no place where the perspectivist could settle.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

> Counter arguments against Nagel
> Counter arguments in relation to Scheme/Content

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-17