Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Scheme, content, philosophy: here we are concerned about whether statements can be made without a relativization to a conceptual system, a language or a subject domain. See also conceptual schemata, reference systems, content, substance, propositional content, semantic content, external/internal.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 133
Incommensuralibilty: presupposes separation scheme/content (3. dogma).
- - -
Rorty I 330
Davidson/Rorty: the speech of the schema or conceptual system tries to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and must therefore fail. He defends the thesis that the idea of an "alternative conceptual scheme" implies the idea of a "true but untranslatable language".
Correspondence: adds nothing illuminating to the simple concept of truth. - Perhaps we should rather say "for the most part true" and to allow people to disagree about detail questions.
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Rorty VI 34
Justification/Rorty: many philosophers believe the more reasons to cite, the better. DavidsonVs: wrong distinction scheme/content. One has already done everything, what one has shown, how certain behavior patterns can be determined (according to Rorty).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997


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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Scheme/Content

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-12-12