|Sentences: sentences are linguistic forms for expressing existent or non-existent issues of conditions, wishes, questions or commands. Statements can be true or false, unlike other forms of sentences like questions or single words. See also subsentential, truth, statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated.
Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating connection: (s) "is a .." - b) stating bond "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." - two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations - stating relations between things are not themselves relation.
1. Kind or sample binding/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs - 2. characterizing binding: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues - b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die - 3. attributive binding: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing binding. E.g. Smiling, Praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing binding to y" - asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y dependent member.
Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals - but also universals can be predicated by universals.
New: distinction between fact types instead of word types.
Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981