Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 252f
"Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/director -> propositional attitude - expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference - every truth function is sign transparent.
I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p".
I 337
Sentence: is not class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed = zero class (all same meaning) - sentence not property of expressions either - solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs - partial sign: class of expression incidents.
I 336
Words describe - sentences do not (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing.
Prior I 35
Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence.
Quine VII 109 ~
Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values.
X 31
Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize -" (and we cannot do that through objects).
X 35
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable.
XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - "Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24