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"Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/director -> propositional attitude - expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference - every truth function is sign transparent.
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p".
Sentence: is not class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed = zero class (all same meaning) - sentence not property of expressions either - solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs - partial sign: class of expression incidents.
Words describe - sentences do not (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing.
Prior I 35
Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence.
Quine VII 109 ~
Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values.
Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize -" (and we cannot do that through objects).
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable.
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - "Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003