Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Frank I 602f
Rylean ancestors/Sensations/Jones/Sellars/Rorty: according to the myth of "Jones" even sensations originally were theoretical entities - "inner" states that were postulated to explain the occurrence of certain thoughts. E.g. the thought thathere is a triangle in front of me when there is none. (appearance, explained by sensation.) - Also sensations had "inner properties" that they did not share with a physical object - "of" is not a relational expression in sensations. "of-red": the dash expresses the simplicity or unanalysability - Jones: the man who invented the consciousness in Sellar’s myth - reports about internal states only after long learning - what is then "inner" - Rorty: postulating something like this does not explain the "non-physical" (just as little as Ryle’s dispositions) - they do not put the physical in opposition to something else - instead of "thought about p" one might as well say: "brain process on p".

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

> Counter arguments against Rorty
> Counter arguments in relation to Rylean Ancestors

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30