Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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V 91
Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? - Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions - Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts.
V 91
Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. - Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior - 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. - We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology.
V 105
VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience.
V 106
Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

> Counter arguments in relation to Rylean Ancestors

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24