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Russell’s paradox/Theoretical Term/Quine: how is it avoided in the theoretical terms? - If y the AF ~^j^j (the attribute of not being an attribute of itself - then by concretisation that "c(yc~cc.) - And thus in particular that yy~yy. - 1) The combination "jj" is ungrammatical, because the order of an statement function must exceed that of its arguments - 2) Even if it was not excluded: if one defines y as ~jj, y obtains a higher order than its bound variable "j" and thus one cannot use c for y in this step, which led to "yy~yy".
Antinomy/Russell: should be neither true nor false, but simply meaningless - A is also avoided by limiting the variables - but after Wieners gP, the model of finite classes does not depend on the futility of the violation - they simply become wrong - with universal variables the systematic ambiguity also becomes void.
Russell’s paradox/Quine: set of all...exists! However, as oc - or "class of all classes that do not ..." does not exist, but "class of all sets that do not ...".
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003