Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Roles, philosophy: the expression role is usually used with an addition such as causal role, functional role, etc. It is signaled that a certain openness is required for a yet outstanding specification for a function within a system. In other words, there is a lack of knowledge concerning the object that performs the function. Linguistically, this is expressed by formulations like "Whatever plays the… role". An example from the philosophy of mind is the causal role of pain. See also functionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Roles - Dictionary of Arguments
ad II 172 Conceptual role/meaning/understanding/Field/(s): instead of saying an expression is understood, if one knows its meaning: lets say we understand it by the conceptual or inferential role. - ((s) One does not have to assume a mapping relation - and also no intentional entities.) >Conceptual role, >Inferential role, >Mapping, >Inferences, >Understanding, >Meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |