|Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Representation/Wright: in contrast, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles have to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction.
Understanding/representation/Wittgenstein: Understanding is rather to be explained by a "sense for" something than by representation of something, or through perception (Wright: e.g. humor).
Wright: does the perhaps sub-cognitive not disappear if we formulate it metalinguistically?
Rorty VI 41ff
Representation/Wright: not merely permissible formulation but philosophically correct, two-digit approach of the truth predicate. (DavidsonVsScheme/contents (3. Dogma): "true" may not be two-digit)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000