|Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Brandom I 923
SearleVsDavidson/representation: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use.
Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth, characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic, but derived from the intentionality of the mind.
The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves.
Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he does not use his ideas and beliefs and desires: he simply has them.
Belief: is a representation: it consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> representation).
Representation needs background of non-representational skills - Compositionality principle without background is not sufficient.
Searle I 271
Pattern: plays in functional terms a causal role, but does not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality).
II 28 f
Representation: speech acts and intentional states have in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. - Key to understanding: fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology - recognition needs not to contain representation.
Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others.
Representations are private, language is public.
Existence: truth condition, possible existence: comprehensibility condition.
Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001