Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Graeser I 129
SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation - Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses - Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet.
Schiffer I 15
Representations/Schiffer: they realize mental states - mental representations are in mentalese.
I 275
Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs - as representational states they have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26