Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Graeser I 129
SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation - Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses - Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet.
Schiffer I 15
Representations/Schiffer: they realize mental states - mental representations are in mentalese.
I 275
Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs - as representational states they have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. M√ľnchen 2002

> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29