|Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
Representation/knowledge pluralism/McGinn: Thesis: representation properties do not only belong to conscious beliefs but semantic predicates can be applied to configurations of another kind in the literal sense. (> Dretske). It boils down to underrepresented content that is not exclusive to reason. This allows us to focus on a comparative epistemology. We have a genus that consists of systems with syntactic and respect relevant properties, and also has a number of species, in which framework the comprehensive, naturally species break down into a special system which differ with respect to other dimensions.
E.g. different animal species may have cognitive strengths and weaknesses.
Genes/representation/McGinn: their construction ability is a testament for their representation capacity. (s) Representing capacity in order to be able to implement provisions.
E.g. Represents the bird, the construction worker, the beaver what he builds, as a nest, dam, or house? McGinn: I would say yes, but the same task could be fulfilled by only representing parts of these things and their relationships._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001