Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor s image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor s "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations (representations) represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
Fodor IV ~ 122
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts.
IV 124
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: Representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude - but the content must not depend neither metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. -
IV 126
Representation/Tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. - so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. - Representations are not used for anything - Computation/Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality.
V 128
Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. - the representations themselves are also inaccessible to RI.
IV 127f
Interpretation: Objects not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc.
IV 201
Representation/Neurophysiological/Mind/Brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies - the brain represents red things as red as aunts as aunts! - (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties) - otherwise we could find out anything with introspection - there are very different interpretations of its diagrams. - (VsConnectionism).
Newen/Schrenk I 133
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations - VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. - Representation: preconceptual - e.g. spatial orientation.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24