Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 136 ~
Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world - but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. - EsfeldVsDescartes: Representation intentional, not pre-conceptive. - Representation/Descartes: 1. belief represents things, 2. access only by representation, 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism) - Fodor: pro Descartes, content of belief state derived from original representative content - Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? Does not allow conclusions.
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I 144 ~
Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity no explanation - which is the correct causal relation?
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I 144 ~
VsRepresentation: Causal relation not fixable - Representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning therefore not in the head.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002


> Counter arguments against Esfeld
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25