|Relevance: is the importance of previously identified aspects of an object, action or situation against other aspects in relation to a description or assessment. See also relevance logic._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Saul A. Kripke on Relevance - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
Relevance of theory-dependent properties (VsBundle Theory).
Bundle theory/ (s): the thesis that the meaning of names consists of a certain set of properties associated with a name, e. g. Moses. Then the meaning of the name Moses would be, among other things, "the one who led the people out of Egypt".
Kripke: So this means that some properties are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is to proceed. All bundle theories are ill at times because they do not specify exactly what a sufficient number of properties must be met.
What are the relevant properties? If you say,"Moses did not exist", this can mean many things: it can mean:"the Israelites did not have a leader" or "their leader was not called Moses" or "there was no man who accomplished all this.
Kripke: the essential point: that we know a priori that Moses, if the biblical story is essentially wrong, did not exist. The biblical story does not indicate any necessary qualities of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things.
One could say "The Jonah of the Book never existed", as one could say "The Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed". Existence is independent of representation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984