|Relativism, philosophy: relativism is a collective term for views that generally refer to the conditions which are fundamental for the occurrence of these views. Variants are based on theories, on languages, on social groups or on cultures. See also internal realism, externalism, observational language, cultural relativism, idealization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
Relativism/subjectivism/Nagel: the relativism is first, self-contradictory, because it is claimed, nothing is the case, second, meaningless, because everything arbitrary is the case, what we say or believe.
I 31 ff
E.g. Rorty (subjectivist): We cannot identify a hook which draws us out of mere coherence to something like the correspondence with the "per se subsistent reality".
NagelVsRorty et.al.: is convincing at first glance, but: if you take these authors seriously, they are just contrary to that consensus on which, according to them the objectivity "is based": people who develop scientific or mathematical beliefs , are in agreement that these things are absolutely true, regardless of if we agree on them. > (realism).
Relativism/NagelVsRelativism/Nagel: the attempt to reinterpret the orderly world image as a projection of our mind, fails due to the need, to find a place for ourselves in the so-ordered world.
If we consider the phenomena always as merely "for us", we need to show that they have no systematic relationship with observed regularities._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979