|Relativization: is a determination of the limitations of a statement by introducing an additional condition, e.g. by specifying a subject domain to which a statement is to be applied to. See also idealization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Relativity/relative/absolute/Quine/Field: Ontological relativity on a background language) - Disanalogy: Places can only be understood by relations of objects - but this does not apply to words. - No "linguistic relation" which would rule out indeterminacy - real indeterminacy/Field: E.g. no fact decides which translation is the best for Newton's "mass" (net weight or relativistic mass) - E.g.
a) impulse = mass times velocity and
b) mass is invariant (independent of the reference system). - The two exclude each other. - Solution: Mass partly denotates the one and partially the other.
Consistency: is here no question of empirical linguistics complete thought: timeless). - E.g.
a) "it would be good"
b) "it would be good according to my standards".
Analog: disquotational true: can then be a statement that is relativized to my norms - but no non-relativized evaluative statement can be disquotational true.
Relativization/Field: Problem: in a relativization to a mere subjective probability law we do not get a truth value, but only conditional probability laws.
Solution: conditional probability laws of B I A & R, where R is the totality of all truths (known or unknown) of a particular type, then conditionalities are perceivable that are believed only from a misunderstood background (not wrong!)
Field: better completely without relativation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980